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Abstract
We investigate the behaviour of load-adaptive rerouting policies in the Wardrop model where decisions must be made on the
basis of stale information. In this model, each one of an infinite number of agents controls an infinitesimal amount of flow, thus
contributing to a network flow which induces latency. In our dynamic extension of this model, agents are activated in a concurrent
and asynchronous fashion and may reroute their flow with the aim of reducing their sustained latency. It is a well-known problem
that in settings where latency information is not always up-to-date, such behaviour may lead to oscillation effects which seriously
harm network performance. Two quantities determine the difficulty of avoiding oscillation: the steepness of the latency functions
and the maximum possible age of the information T .
In this work we ask for conditions that the rerouting policies must adhere to in order to converge to an equilibrium despite the
information being stale. We consider simple policies which sample another path in a first step and then migrate from the current
path to the new one with a probability that is a function of the anticipated latency gain. In fact we can show that our class of policies
guarantees convergence if the latter migration probability function satisfies a certain smoothness condition that resembles Lipschitz
continuity. It turns out that for smooth adaptation policies where the migration probability is chosen small enough relative to the
inverse of the steepness of the latency functions and T , the population actually converges to an equilibrium.
In addition, we analyse the speed of convergence towards approximate equilibria of two specific variants of smooth adaptive
routing policies, e.g., for a replication policy adopted from evolutionary game theory.
c© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Game theoretic models of strategic aspects of routing processes have attracted a lot of attention recently. We study
a well-known network routing game in the Wardrop model where an infinite set of agents controls an infinitesimal
amount of flow each. The flow induces latencies on the edges, and agents try to minimise their sustained latency
selfishly. We consider a dynamic variant of this model where agents are allowed to reroute their traffic from time to
time using simple load-adaptive rerouting policies. When agents apply such a policy sequentially, a potential function
argument ensures convergence towards an equilibrium, as long as the steps made by the agents are selfish. A step is
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called selfish if it shifts traffic from a path with higher latency to a path with lower latency. In this work, however, we
consider the case where agents act in a distributed and concurrent fashion, making their rerouting decisions based on
information that may be stale. In this scenario, simple adaptation policies like best response, that is, always migrating
to a path with minimal latency, lead to oscillation effects. Such effects are known in practice [15,16,19,24] and are
a major obstacle in implementing real-time load-adaptive traffic engineering protocols. Two properties determine the
strength of the oscillation effects: the age of the information and the sensitivity of the latency functions to small
changes of the flow.
In this work we consider the question of how agents should behave in order to avoid oscillation and guarantee
convergence towards Wardrop equilibria. As a model of stale information we assume the bulletin board model
introduced by Mitzenmacher [17] in the context of dynamic load balancing. In this model, latency information is
posted on a bulletin board which is updated at regular intervals of length T . The bulletin board is visible to all agents
but it does not always contain recent information. Agents may revise their current routing path at discrete times
sampled according to a Poisson process. Whenever activated, an agent may make a (possibly randomised) decision
to exchange its current path for another one. Despite its simplicity, the bulletin board model is well-suited to study
the effects of stale information. Naive rerouting strategies like best or better response dynamics exhibit oscillating
behaviour and do not converge towards Wardrop equilibria. In this work, we devise a class of rerouting policies that
successfully avoid oscillation effects.
Our class of policies is inspired by the so-called replicator dynamics known from evolutionary game theory. It is
simple, stateless, requires little computational effort, and produces myopic, selfish steps. We study our model in the
so-called fluid limit evaluating differential equations at discrete steps in time. In addition to proving convergence to
Wardrop equilibria we also give upper bounds on the time to reach approximate equilibria.1
1.1. Our results
We show that for every class of latency functions with bounded first derivative and for every update period length
T there exists a class of rerouting policies that converge towards a Wardrop equilibrium. More precisely, assume that
the slope of the latency functions of the edges in the network is bounded by β and denote the maximum path length
by D. Now, define α = 1/(4 T β D). We show that any selfish rerouting policy converges if the migration rate from a
path P to a path Q with less latency is bounded by α multiplied with the anticipated latency gain.
To study the time of convergence, we consider two specific policies. Both policies proceed in two steps. First,
every agent samples another path. Second, if the sampled path has less latency than the originating path, the agent
migrates towards the sampled path with a probability proportional to α and the anticipated latency improvement. The
two policies differ in the way a path is sampled. The first policy samples a path uniformly at random. We show that
the total number of rounds in which more than an -fraction of agents utilises paths that differ by more than δ from
the minimum latency of their commodity if bounded by O (|P|/(T ) · (`max/δ)2) where |P| is the number of paths
in the network and `max is the maximum possible latency. To get rid of the factor |P| we introduce a second policy
which samples a path with a probability proportional to its flow. For this policy, we show that the total number of
rounds in which more than an -fraction of the agents utilises paths with latency at least δ above the average latency
of their commodity is bounded by O (1/(T ) · (`max/δ)2).
1.2. Related work
The Wardrop model was introduced originally as a model of road traffic in [25]. A potential function showing
existence of Wardrop equilibria and which is used also in our work was presented in [2]. Roughgarden and Tardos [22]
brought this model to the attention of computer scientists analysing the degradation of network performance due to
the selfishness of the agents, the so-called price of anarchy. Since then, this model has been subject to various studies,
most of which consider bounds on the price of anarchy and ways to reduce it [20,23,21,14,8,13].
The bulletin board model of stale information was introduced by Mitzenmacher [17] in the context of load
balancing. In Mitzenmacher’s model, jobs (agents) enter the system at Poisson rates, are assigned to machines
1 A preliminary version of this work has been presented in [12].
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(resources) and are removed from the system after being processed. Both the number of agents and the number of
resources go to infinity whereas the ratio between the number of jobs and the number of machines is fixed. In our
model the number of resources (the edges of the considered network) is fixed whereas the number of agents is infinite.
Agents are not removed from the system but merely reassign their load at intervals. Mitzenmacher’s results are mainly
negative: Decisions based on stale information can degrade performance even in comparison with a fully random
assignment of jobs. For some naive strategies this is the case in our model as well. However, as a positive result we
can show that the system can come to a perfect equilibrium solely based on old information.
Dahlin [9] shows that using stale load information in combination with its age and thus employing a greater
computational effort can help to improve network performance. In our scenario, the information about the age of
the information is not available. Cao and Nyberg [7] present an approach which routes the jobs to the machine with
expected shortest queue, but their result is also negative. They show that this does not always minimise the average
waiting time.
A replication policy falling into the class of policies considered here has also been studied in [11] in a model
which neglects the effect of stale information. It was shown that the replication policy converges towards a Wardrop
equilibrium provided that the agents always have up-to-date information about the latencies. In this work we will
determine the factor by which this dynamics has to be slowed down in order to guarantee convergence. Recently,
in [10] the results presented here have been extended to a particular rerouting policy which does not satisfy the α-
smoothness condition. The focus of [10] is to design a rerouting policy which converges very quickly. In particular,
this policy does not depend on the maximum slope of the latency functions but rather on their elasticity.
Recently, network routing problems have been addressed from the perspective of online learning. The regret of an
agent is defined as the difference between their average latency over time and the latency of the best path in hindsight.
Algorithms for no-regret routing guarantee that the regret approaches zero. E.g., in [1,5] the authors show convergence
towards equilibria for a population of agents applying no-regret algorithms. Their convergence rates depend on the
regret bounds and also on the maximum slope of the latency functions.
Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [3] consider distributed algorithms for optimising a global cost function defined on a
network flow with asynchronous agents. It is known that the problems of optimising a global cost function and finding
a Wardrop equilibrium can be cast into one other by using marginal cost latency functions [22,25]. The main difference
between their and our work is that they consider a specific distributed algorithm which is comparable to a careful best
response rerouting policy in our scenario whereas we consider a broad class of very simple rerouting policies. Their
algorithm requires much more computational effort than our simple sampling policies. Also, in the model of Bertsekas
and Tsitsiklis, traffic is rerouted at discrete time steps. In contrast to this, our model is continuous. Furthermore, we
also give bounds on the update frequency depending on network parameters and consider the time of convergence.
2. The model
2.1. The Wardrop routing model
We are given a network, i. e., a directed, finite multi-graph G = (V, E) equipped with latency functions
`e : [0, 1] 7→ R≥0, e ∈ E mapping flow on the edges to the induced latency. Throughout this paper we will assume
that the latency functions are continuous and non-decreasing and have finite first-order derivatives on the entire range.
An instance of the Wardrop routing game [25] is specified by a set of commodities [k] = {1, . . . , k} where each
commodity is specified by a source si ∈ V , a sink ti ∈ V and a flow demand ri that is to be routed from si to ti . We
normalise
∑
i∈[k] ri = 1. By Pi we denote the set of paths connecting si and ti , and by P =
⋃
i∈[k] Pi we denote the
set of all paths. Let D = maxP∈P |P| denote the maximum length of a path.
A flow vector f = ( fP )P∈P is feasible if for all P ∈ P , fP ≥ 0 and for all commodities i ∈ [k] the flow demands
are satisfied, i. e.,
∑
P∈Pi fP = ri . The set of feasible flows is denoted byF . The flow on edge e is fe =
∑
P3e fP and
the induced latency on this edge is `e( fe). The latency is additive along a path, i. e., `P ( f ) =∑e∈P `e( fe). Let `max
denote an upper bound on the latency of a path, e.g., maxP∈P
∑
e∈P `e(1). Furthermore, let L i =
∑
P∈Pi ( fP/ri ) ·`P
denote the average latency of commodity i and let L =∑P∈P fP · `P denote the overall average latency.
A flow vector f can be interpreted as an infinite population of agents carrying an infinitesimal amount of load each.
Then, fP is the fraction of agents utilising path P . Agents strive to minimise the latency their flow sustains selfishly.
Game theory predicts that agents, when equipped with complete and accurate knowledge about the game, will come
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to an equilibrium state where no agent can improve its own situation unilaterally by shifting its own flow to another
path. A useful characterisation of such equilibria in the Wardrop model is the following:
Definition 1 (Wardrop Equilibrium). A feasible flow vector f is at a Wardrop equilibrium iff for all commodities
i ∈ [k] and all paths P, P ′ ∈ Pi with fP > 0 it holds that `P ( f ) ≤ `P ′( f ).
2.2. Adaptive routing policies
Our main focus in this work is on a very broad class of adaptive routing policies for the agents that can be described
in the following way. Each agent becomes active at discrete points in time generated by a fixed-rate Poisson process
for each agent independently. Whenever an agent is activated, they revise their routing strategy (i. e. the selected path)
by performing the following two steps. Consider an agent of commodity i ∈ [k] currently using path P ∈ Pi .
(1) Sampling: The agent samples a path Q ∈ Pi according to some probability distribution. Let σP Q( f ) denote the
probability that an agent currently using path P samples path Q.
(2) Migration: The agent switches to the sampled path Q with some probability specified by the function µ(`P , `Q).
Let us first give some examples for possible sampling and migration policies, respectively.
Typically σP Q will be independent of the originating path P . Uniform sampling means that all paths have uniform
probability, i. e., σP Q = 1/|Pi | for all i ∈ [k], P, Q ∈ Pi . Instead of choosing strategies uniformly at random, one
can also imagine that agents choose other agents from the same commodity uniformly at random. In evolutionary
game theory, this kind of sampling is frequently used to motivate the well-known replicator dynamics. We call this
approach proportional sampling since the probability to sample path Q is proportional to the fraction of agents using
it, i. e. σP Q = fQ/ri . For proportional sampling, the sampling probabilities are functions of the flow vector f . Other
generalisations of this kind may be useful. In general, we assume that σP Q is a continuous function of f . Observe that
this also covers the uniform case where σP Q is constant with respect to f . Also note that a population cannot converge
towards a Wardrop equilibrium if σP Q may be zero for some path Q that is used in every Wardrop equilibrium. Hence,
we also require σP Q > 0 for all Q ∈ P .
Similarly, there is a variety of strategies for the migration rule µ. A natural, but, as we will see, deceptive, migration
rule is the better response policy defined by
µ(`P , `Q) =
{
1 if `P > `Q
0 otherwise.
Typical migration rules µ(·, ·) that we consider here satisfy µ(`P , `Q) = 0 if `Q ≥ `P and will be non-decreasing in
the latency difference `P−`Q . Another natural migration rule is to switch from P to Q with a probability proportional
to the latency difference:
µ(`P , `Q) =
{
`P−`Q
`max
if `P > `Q
0 otherwise.
We call this migration rule linear migration policy.
As discussed above we need to assume that the migration rule is not too greedy. We formalise this requirement in
the following sense:
Definition 2 (α-Smoothness). We say that a migration-rule µ : R≥0 × R≥0 7→ [0, 1] is α-smooth for some α > 0 if
for all `P ≥ `Q ≥ 0 the migration probability satisfies µ(`P , `Q) ≤ α · (`P − `Q).
Note that if µ can be written as a function of `P − `Q then α-smoothness corresponds to Lipschitz-continuity at 0.
The better response migration rule is not α-smooth for any α and therefore is not smooth at all. The linear migration
policy is (1/`max)-smooth. The combination of proportional sampling and linear migration policy corresponds to the
replicator dynamics considered in evolutionary game theory and analysed in this model in [11].
Assuming that each agent’s amount of traffic is infinitesimally small we can now describe the evolution of the
population shares over time in terms of the fluid-limit. Given the sampling and migration rule and normalising the
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Poisson activation rate of the agents to be 1, we can compute the rate ρP Q at which agents migrate from path P to
path Q:
ρP Q( f ) = fP · σP Q( f ) · µ(`P ( f ), `Q( f )).
Summing up over all paths Q we obtain an ordinary differential equation describing the growth rates (or derivative
with respect to time) of the population share for P:
f˙P =
∑
Q∈Pi
(ρQ P ( f )− ρP Q( f )). (1)
If the policy satisfies the properties discussed above, the right-hand side of this equation is Lipschitz continuous which,
by the Picard–Lindelo¨f Theorem (see, e.g. [6]), guarantees the existence of a unique solution ξ(t), t ≥ 0 for any initial
population f0.
Mainly for reasons of comparison we also consider the best response policy which is not based on sampling but
shortest-path computations. Here, each agent reconsidering their strategy chooses a best reply, i. e., a shortest path with
respect to latency, belonging to their own commodity. Denote the set of all best replies by β( f ). Since the shortest
path need not be unique, this leads to a differential inclusion rather than a differential equation.
f˙ ∈ { f ′ − f (t) | f ′ ∈ β( f (t))}. (2)
Note that smoothed variants of the best response dynamics also fit into the class of smooth policies, although with
large smoothness parameter. To that end, we can define
σP Q = exp(−c · `Q)∑
Q′ exp(−c · `Q′)
for some parameter c. If c is large, then σP Q will be close to 1 for a path with minimum latency and close to 0
otherwise. By combining this sampling rule with a smoothed better response migration rule, we get an approximation
of the best response dynamics.
Under stale information we will show that this dynamics does not converge towards an equilibrium even for simple
networks with two links only.
2.3. Stale information
For the above derivation of Eq. (1) we assumed that the information on which the agents base their decisions is
always up-to-date. In order to study the effects of stale information we apply a bulletin board model introduced by
Mitzenmacher [18]. All information relevant to the rerouting process is posted on a bulletin board at the beginning
of every phase of fixed length T . We strongly emphasise that this is a purely theoretical model that should reflect the
effect of stale information in as simply as possible. Similar effects might occur in networks where latency information
is broadcasted at intervals or uploaded to a server from where it can be polled by clients.
The edge latencies `e, e ∈ E , are posted on the bulletin board. We assume that the selection rule is based on the
latency information on the bulletin board instead of the true latencies. This way, our differential equation for f˙ (t) now
depends not only on f (t) but also on f (tˆ) where tˆ marks the beginning of the respective update period. Fix an update
period length T and let tˆ = bt/T c · T denote the beginning of a phase containing t . Then, the migration rate becomes
ρˆP Q(t) = fP · σP Q( f (tˆ)) · µ(`P ( f (tˆ)), `Q( f (tˆ)))
and our dynamical system becomes
f˙P (t) =
∑
Q∈Pi
(ρˆQ P (t)− ρˆP Q(t)) (3)
f (0) = f0.
Note that the right-hand side of this differential equation may now have discontinuities whenever the bulletin board is
updated. However, since it is Lipschitz continuous within every phase, there exists a unique solution for each update
period and, hence, on all of R≥0.
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Correspondingly, the best response policy under stale information is then
f˙ (t) ∈ β( f (tˆ))− f (t) (4)
f (0) = f0.
As a convention, whenever the value of t is clear from context, all symbols marked with a hat (ˆ) will refer to time tˆ ,
e.g., we may write f instead of f (t) and fˆ instead of f (tˆ). Similarly, we write ˆ`e = `e( f (tˆ)), etc.
3. Preliminaries
We start by showing that any of our rerouting policies converges towards the set of Wardrop equilibria when
information is always up-to-date. On the contrary, we show that the best response policy fails to converge however
small the update period is chosen.
3.1. Convergence under up-to-date information
Assuming that information is always up-to-date, convergence towards Wardrop equilibria can be shown using the
Beckmann–McGuire–Winsten potential [2] defined as
Φ =
∑
e∈E
∫ fe
0
`e(u) du.
This potential function precisely absorbs progress. An infinitesimal fraction of agents du moving from path P to Q
improving their latency by `P − `Q causes an infinitesimal change of the potential of size (`P − `Q) du. Hence, a
population f minimises this potential function iff no agent can improve her situation unilaterally, i. e., f is a Wardrop
equilibrium.
We can use Lyapunov’s direct method to prove convergence in the case of current information:
Theorem 1 (Laypunov (see, e.g., [4])). Consider a dynamic system x˙ = g(x) and a closed set C ⊆ D. If there exists
a neighbourhood U of C and a continuously differentiable function E : D 7→ R≥0 with E(x) = 0 if and only if x ∈ C
and
E˙(x) < 0 ∀x /∈ C, (5)
then the set C is asymptotically stable.
Theorem 2. Suppose that σP Q( f ) is Lipschitz continuous in f and positive for all i ∈ [k] and all P, Q ∈ Pi , and
µ(`P , `Q) is Lipschitz continuous, non-negative, and zero only if `P ≤ `Q . Then, for any f0 ∈ F , the solution ξ( f0, t)
of the dynamical system given by Eq. (1) converges towards the set of Wardrop equilibria.
Proof. Consider the derivative with respect to time of Φ along a solution of Eq. (1).
Φ˙( f ) =
∑
e∈E
f˙e · `e( fe) =
∑
P∈P
f˙P · `P ( f ) =
∑
P,Q∈P
ρP Q · (`Q − `P ).
By definition ofµ(·, ·) and σP Q(·)we know that ρP Q is positive if `Q−`P < 0 and zero otherwise. Hence, Φ˙( f ) ≤ 0.
The inequality is strict if f is not at a Wardrop equilibrium. Consequently, Φ(·) − Φ∗ is a Lyapunov function and
the solution orbit points strictly into every contour set of Φ implying that the solution approaches the set of Wardrop
equilibria. 
3.2. Oscillation of best response
Similarly, the best response dynamics converges towards a Wardrop equilibrium under up-to-date information.
However, there exist instances and initial conditions such that under stale information, the best response dynamics
oscillates, no matter how small we choose the update period length T .
We consider an instance with two parallel links with continuous latency functions `1(x) = `2(x) = max{0, β ·(x−
1
2 )} for a parameter β > 0 and demand r = 1. Note that the latency functions have maximum slope β. At a Wardrop
equilibrium we have f1 = f2 = 1/2 and `1( f1) = `2( f2) = 0.
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First observe that the solution orbit of the best response dynamics (4) is unique within any update period and
therefore on all of R≥0. Consider an update period starting at time t0 such that f1 6= 1/2 6= f2. Then, for t ≤ T , the
best reply is uniquely defined and the population on the other link decreases exponentially fast, i. e.,
f1(t0 + t) =
{
f1(t0) · exp(−t) if `1( f1(t0)) > `2( f2(t0))
1− (1− f1(t0)) · exp(−t) if `1( f1(t0)) < `2( f2(t0))
and f2(t) = 1 − f1(t). Note that for our instance, the condition `1( f1(t)) > `2( f2(t)) is equivalent to f1(t) > 1/2.
As an initial condition, we choose
f1(0) = 1exp(−T )+ 1 and f2(0) =
exp(−T )
exp(−T )+ 1 .
Since f1(0) > 1/2 we have f1(T ) = f1(0) · exp(−T ) < 1/2 and
f1(2 T ) = 1− (1− f1(T )) · exp(−T )
= 1−
(
1− 1
exp(−T )+ 1 · exp(−T )
)
· exp(−T )
= f1(0).
The solution oscillates coming back to its initial configuration every other round. How small do we have to make T
in order to guarantee that the maximum latency does not exceed the Wardrop latency (which, in this case, is zero) by
more than ? At the beginning of every round i the deviation from the Wardrop latency is
X = max{`1( f1(i · T )), `2( f2(i · T ))}
= β ·
(
1
exp(−T )+ 1 −
1
2
)
= β · (1− exp(−T ))
2 · exp(−T )+ 2 .
Observe that this latency is sustained by more than one-half of the agents. In order to guarantee that X ≤  we must
have
T ≤ ln
(
1+ 2 /β
1− 2 /β
)
= ln
(
1+ 2 
β
)
− ln
(
1− 2 
β
)
= O
(

β
)
.
In particular, we can avoid oscillation of the best response policy only for T = 0, i. e., in the case of current
information.
4. Convergence under stale information
We have seen that under up-to-date information the potential decreases. More precisely, if agents migrate from path
P to path Q at rate ρP Q , they cause an infinitesimal potential gain of ρP Q · (`Q − `P ) du which is negative for selfish
policies. Consider a phase in the bulletin board model starting with a population fˆ ∈ F and ending with a population
f ∈ F . Let∆ fP Q denote the fraction of agents migrating from path P to path Q within this phase. Since throughout
the phase the latency values on the bulletin board are fixed to the values they had at the beginning of the phase, agents
“see” a virtual potential gain of
VP Q = ∆ fP Q · (`Q − `P ). (6)
Unfortunately, summing up over all pairs of paths, this does not yield the true potential gain in one round since the
latency values do actually change during the phase. The error terms
Ue =
∫ fe
fˆe
(`e(u)− `e( fˆe)) du (7)
account for this difference. The following lemma shows that the virtual potential gain terms and the error terms
actually sum up to the true potential gain.
3364 S. Fischer, B. Vo¨cking / Theoretical Computer Science 410 (2009) 3357–3371
Lemma 3. Let fˆ , f ∈ F and VP Q and Ue be defined as in Eqs. (6) and (7), respectively. Then,
Φ( f )− Φ( fˆ ) =
∑
e∈E
Ue +
∑
P,Q∈P
VP Q .
The virtual potential gain of one round in which the flow vector changes from fˆ to f is denoted by
V( fˆ , f ) =
∑
P,Q
VP Q =
∑
e∈E
`e( fˆ ) · ( fe − fˆe). (8)
The last equality will be shown in the proof of Lemma 3. For the class of policies under consideration, every term
VP Q is non-positive and at least one is negative. The following lemma shows that if the rerouting policy is smooth
enough, the real potential gain is still at least half of the virtual potential gain and is thus, in particular, negative. Recall
that D denotes an upper bound on the length of any path P ∈ P .
Lemma 4. Suppose that there exist constants α, β > 0 such that
(1) the migration rule µ(·, ·) is α-smooth,
(2) the slope of the latency functions is bounded from above by β, i. e., for all e ∈ E, u ∈ [0, 1], `′e(u) ≤ β.
Define T = 1/(4 D α β) and consider a phase beginning at time tˆ with an update of the bulletin board and ending at
time t = tˆ + τ , τ ≤ T . For any solution of a routing policy of the form of Eq. (3) it holds that
∆Φ = Φ(t)− Φ(tˆ) ≤ 1
2
· V( f (tˆ), f (t)) ≤ 0.
To avoid unnecessary confusion, let us remark that this upper bound on ∆Φ, which is negative, should be interpreted
as a lower bound on its absolute value. We can now prove both lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 3. We write ˆ`e = `e( fˆe). By definition of Φ,
Φ( f )− Φ( fˆ ) =
∑
e∈E
∫ fe
fˆe
`e(u) du
=
∑
e∈E
(∫ fe
fˆe
(`e(u)− ˆ`e) du + ( fe − fˆe) · ˆ`e
)
=
∑
e∈E
(
Ue +
∑
P∈P
∑
Q3e
(∆ fP Q −∆ fQ P ) · ˆ`e
)
.
Now observe, that the term ∆ fP Q · ˆ`e occurs positively for all e ∈ Q and negatively for all e ∈ P . Hence,
Φ( f )− Φ( fˆ ) =
∑
e∈E
Ue +
∑
P,Q∈P
∆ fP Q
(∑
e∈Q
ˆ`e −
∑
e′∈P
ˆ`e′
)
=
∑
e∈E
Ue +
∑
P,Q∈P
∆ fP Q · ( ˆ`Q − ˆ`P )
=
∑
e∈E
Ue +
∑
P,Q∈P
VP Q,
our claim. 
Proof of Lemma 4. We consider a phase starting at time tˆ and ending at time t = tˆ + τ . As noted in the model
description, we will omit the arguments tˆ and t , respectively, and write fˆ = f (tˆ) and f = f (t). A hat (ˆ) indicates
symbols referring to values at time tˆ whereas symbols without a hat refer to values at time t . The difference between
two values between time tˆ and t is indicated by a preceding ∆, e.g., ∆ fe = fe − fˆe.
By Lemma 3, the potential change in one round is
∆Φ = Φ − Φˆ =
∑
e∈E
Ue +
∑
P,Q∈P
VP Q . (9)
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We know that the virtual potential gain is negative. The error terms may be positive, but we will see that their absolute
value is at most half of the absolute value of the virtual potential gain. To that end, we partition the virtual potential
gain terms into chunks
V eP Q =
{ VP Q
4 D if e ∈ P ∪ Q
0 otherwise,
which we will set against the error terms. Since the paths P, Q 3 e contain at most 2 D edges altogether and since
VP Q ≤ 0, we have∑
e∈E
V eP Q ≥ 2 D ·
VP Q
4 D
= 1
2
· VP Q .
Substituting this into Eq. (9) yields
∆Φ ≤
∑
e∈E
Ue +
∑
P,Q∈P
(∑
e∈E
V eP Q +
1
2
VP Q
)
=
∑
e∈E
Ue + ∑
P,Q∈P
V eP Q
+ 1
2
∑
P,Q∈P
VP Q
=
∑
e∈E
Ue + ∑
P,Q∈P
V eP Q
+ 1
2
· V( fˆ , f ).
To obtain the assertion of the lemma it remains to show that the first sum is non-positive. We show that this holds
termwise, i. e., for all e ∈ E ,
Ue ≤ −
∑
P,Q∈P
V eP Q . (10)
We prove this inequality by writing Ue as an upper sum and using an inductive argument on the number of terms in
this sum. Fix an edge e ∈ E and, for the time being, suppose that e is a “growing” edge, i. e., fe > fˆe. We consider
pairs of paths (Pi , Qi ) with e ∈ Qi and ˆ`Pi > ˆ`Qi in ascending order of ˆ`Pi − ˆ`Qi for i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, p ≤ |P|2 being
the number of pairs of paths. Let
f 0e = fˆe and f ie = f i−1e +∆ fPi Qi for i > 0
and observe that fe ≤ f pe . We show that∫ f ie
fˆe
(`e(u)− ˆ`e) du ≤ −
i∑
j=1
V ePj Q j
which, for i = p, implies inequality (10) and concludes the proof. The situation is depicted in Fig. 1.
The claim certainly holds for i = 0. For the induction step, we derive an upper bound on the growth of the flow
and the latency on resource e due to the first i path pairs. By the dynamics given in Eq. (3), we can upper bound the
increase of the flow:
f ie − fˆe =
∫ t
tˆ
i∑
j=1
fPj (u) · σPj Q j ( fˆ ) · µ( ˆ`Pj , ˆ`Q j ) du
≤
∫ t
tˆ
i∑
j=1
fPj (u) · σPj Q j ( fˆ ) · α · ( ˆ`Pj − ˆ`Q j ) du
≤ α · ( ˆ`Pi − ˆ`Qi ) ·
∫ t
tˆ
i∑
j=1
fPj (u) · σPj Q j ( fˆ ) du
≤ T · α · ( ˆ`Pi − ˆ`Qi ). (11)
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Fig. 1. Bounding the error term Ue piecewise. The area under the function `e between fˆe and fe is the true contribution to the potential difference.
The area between ˆ`e and `e(·) is the error term Ue . The rectangular areas are the virtual potential gain terms V eP Q seen by the respective pair of
paths P, Q. Each such area contains the respective section of Ue .
In the first inequality we have used α-smoothness of µ(·, ·). The second inequality is due to the fact that ˆ`Pj − ˆ`Q j ≤
ˆ`Pi − ˆ`Qi by our ordering of the (Pj , Q j ). For the last step we have used σP Q ≤ 1,
∑
P∈P fP = 1, and t − tˆ ≤ T .
Furthermore, since the slope of `e is bounded from above by β, using Eq. (11) we have
`e( f
i
e )− `e( fˆe) ≤ ( f ie − fˆe) · β
≤ T · α · β · ( ˆ`Pi − ˆ`Qi ). (12)
Using this upper bound, we can now prove our claim:∫ f ie
fˆe
(`e(u)− ˆ`e) du =
∫ f i−1e
fˆe
(`e(u)− ˆ`e) du +
∫ f ie
f i−1e
(`e(u)− ˆ`e) du
≤ −
i−1∑
j=1
V ePj Q j + ( f ie − f i−1e ) · (`e( f ie )− ˆ`e)
= −
i−1∑
j=1
V ePj Q j +∆ fPi Qi · (`e( f ie )− ˆ`e)
≤ −
i−1∑
j=1
V ePj Q j +∆ fPi Qi · T · α · β · ( ˆ`Pi − ˆ`Qi ),
where the first inequality uses the induction hypothesis and monotonicity of `e and the second uses Inequality (12).
Finally, by the definition of V ePi Qi = ( ˆ`Qi − ˆ`Pi ) ·∆ fPi Qi /(4 D) and the definition of T = 1/(4 D α β),∫ f ie
fˆe
(`e(u)− ˆ`e) du ≤ −
i−1∑
j=1
V ePj Q j − V ePi Qi · 4 · D · T · α · β
= −
i∑
j=1
V ePj Q j ,
which concludes our inductive argument. To see that the same argument holds for edges e ∈ E with fe < fˆe,
we consider pairs of paths Pi , Qi with e ∈ Pi and ˆ`Pi > ˆ`Qi . In this case, for Eq. (11) we obtain f ie − fˆe ≥
T · α · ( ˆ`Qi − ˆ`Pi ). Analogously, for Eq. (12) we obtain `e( f ie )− `e( fˆe) ≥ T · α · β · ( ˆ`Qi − ˆ`Pi ). The remainder of
the proof is unchanged. 
Convergence is a direct consequence of this lemma.
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Corollary 5. Suppose that there exist constants α, β > 0 such that
(1) the migration rule µ(·, ·) is α-smooth,
(2) the slope of the latency functions is bounded from above by β, i. e., for all e ∈ E, u ∈ [0, 1], `′e(u) ≤ β,
and the bulletin board is updated at intervals of length T ≤ 1/(4 D α β). Furthermore, suppose that σP Q( f ) is
Lipschitz continuous in f and positive for all i ∈ [k] and all P, Q ∈ Pi , and µ(`P , `Q) is Lipschitz continuous,
non-negative, and zero only if `P ≤ `Q . Then, for any f0 ∈ F , the solution of the dynamical system given by Eq. (3)
in the bulletin board model converges towards the set of Wardrop equilibria.
Proof. Let Φ∗ = min f Φ( f ) denote the optimal potential. It is sufficient to show that for any Φ˜ > Φ∗ there exists a
phase starting with a flow f such thatΦ( f ) ≤ Φ˜. Consider the convex set CΦ˜ containing all points f withΦ( f ) ≤ Φ˜.
Note that CΦ˜ contains all Wardrop equilibria. Let V( f ) denote the virtual potential gain in one update period starting
with population f . Note that V(·) is non-positive, continuous in f , and zero only if f is a Wardrop equilibrium.
Furthermore, CΦ˜ is compact. Hence, there exists an Φ˜ > 0 such that
inf
f /∈CΦ˜
{−V( f )} ≥ Φ˜ .
Let ∆Φ( f ) denote the true potential gain of an update period starting with population f . Lemma 4 asserts that
inf
f /∈CΦ˜
{−∆Φ( f )} ≥ Φ˜
2
.
Now, consider a sequence of flows ( f (i T ))i∈{0,...,k} with f (i T ) /∈ CΦ˜ . Then, the potential is at most
Φ( f (k T )) ≤ Φ( f (0))− k · Φ˜
2
,
and, since Φ( f (k T )) ≥ Φ˜ by assumption, any such sequence must be of finite length. 
5. Convergence time
Although we have seen that our smooth adaptive rerouting policies converge towards Wardrop equilibria in the
long run, none of them will necessarily reach an exact equilibrium. In order to give bounds on the convergence speed
we consider the time to reach approximate equilibria. We consider both the uniform and the proportional sampling
policy in combination with the linear migration policy. Recall that for the linear migration policy µ(`P , `Q) =
max{(`P − `Q)/`max, 0} we have α = 1/`max. Again, let β be an upper bound on the slope of the latency functions.
The definition of Wardrop equilibria requires that all agents have minimal and therefore also average latency. What
kind of approximate equilibrium can we expect to reach with the policies under consideration? Note that since agents
are activated at Poisson rates, the fraction of agents using high-latency paths will never vanish completely. In order
to reflect this fact, we relax the definition of Wardrop equilibria in two aspects: We require that almost all agents are
close to the minimum or average latency.
Also, our analyses will disclose a fundamental difference between the proportional and the uniform sampling rule.
We will see that for the uniform sampling rule we can prove convergence towards a stricter definition of approximate
equilibria at the cost of a factor |P| in the time of convergence.
5.1. Uniform sampling
Recall that the uniform sampling rule is defined as σP Q = 1/|Pi | for P, Q ∈ Pi and any commodity i ∈ [k].
Definition 3 ((δ, )-Equilibrium). For a flow f ∈ F , let `imin = min{`P ( f ) | P ∈ Pi } denote the minimum latency
of commodity i ∈ [k]. For every commodity i and every path P ∈ Pi the agents on path P are said to be δ-unsatisfied
iff `P ( f ) > `imin+ δ. The flow f is said to be at an (δ, )-equilibrium iff the total volume of δ-unsatisfied agents is at
most .
For the uniform sampling policy the growth rate of the flow on every path is bounded by the inverse of the number
of paths. Hence, our time bounds must also depend on this parameter.
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Theorem 6. Suppose that the bulletin board is updated at intervals of length
T ≤ min
{
1
4 D α β
, 1
}
.
For the uniform sampling policy combined with the linear migration policy, the number of update periods not starting
at a (δ, )-equilibrium is bounded from above by
O
(
maxi∈[k]{|Pi |}
 · T ·
(
`max
δ
)2)
.
Proof. Let m = maxi∈[k]{|Pi }. We consider a phase that does not start at a (δ, )-equilibrium and compute the
virtual potential gain of the phase. Let t denote the start of this phase. First note that the population shares
cannot decrease much within one round. Since for every P ∈ P , f˙P ≥ − fP , at the end of the update period
fP (t + T ) ≥ fP (t) · exp(−T ). In particular, we know that the volume of δ-unsatisfied agents is at least  at the
beginning of the phase and hence at least  · exp(−1) throughout the phase if T ≤ 1.
We now consider the total contribution of δ-unsatisfied agents to the virtual potential gain. Let Pδi denote the set
of expensive paths of commodity i , i. e., Pδi = {P ∈ Pi | `P (t) > `imin + δ} and let Pδ =
⋃
i∈[k] Pδi . Furthermore,
let P∗i denote a path with minimal latency in commodity i . First note that the contributions of all agents to the virtual
potential gain is non-positive since agents only migrate if this decreases their latency. From this fact and Lemma 4 it
follows that the true potential gain in one round is
∆Φ ≤ −1
2
∑
P∈Pδ
VP P∗i .
For every commodity i ∈ [k] and every path P ∈ Pi the probability for an agent on path P to sample path P∗i is at
least
σP P∗i =
1
|Pi | ≥
1
m
.
If P ∈ Pδi , then the migration probability is
µ(`P (t), `
i
min) =
`P (t)− `imin
`max
≥ δ
`max
.
The total virtual potential gain over a phase of length T is hence∑
P∈Pδ
VP P∗i ≤ T
∑
P∈Pδ
inf
u∈[t,t+T ) fP (u) ·
δ · (`P∗i (t)− `P (t))
m · `max
≤ −T
∑
P∈Pδ
fP (t) · exp(−1) · δ
2
m · `max
≤ −T  · δ
2 · exp(−1)
m · `max
where the last inequality holds because the flow is not at an (δ, )-equilibrium at time t and hence
∑
P∈Pδ fP (t) ≥ .
By Lemma 4, the potential decreases by at least half of this in every round, i. e.,
∆Φ ≤ −T  · δ
2 · exp(−1)
2 · m · `max
as long as we are not at a (δ, )-equilibrium. Suppose that we are not at a (δ, )-equilibrium for n rounds. Then, since
Φ( f ) ≤ `max for every f ∈ F and in particular for f = f0, after these n rounds it holds that
Φ ≤ `max − n · T  · δ
2 · exp(−1)
2 · m · `max .
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Since furthermore Φ ≥ 0, it follows that
n ≤ O
(
m
T · 
(
`max
δ
)2)
,
which is our claim. 
5.2. Proportional sampling
Using proportional instead of uniform sampling we can get rid of the factor maxi∈[k]{|Pi |} at the cost of a slightly
weaker definition of approximate equilibria. Recall that the proportional sampling rule is defined as σP Q( f ) = fQ/ri
for all paths P, Q ∈ Pi and any commodity i ∈ [k].
Definition 4 (Weak (δ, )-Equilibrium). Consider a flow f ∈ F . For every commodity i ∈ [k] and every path P ∈ Pi
the agents on path P are said to be weakly δ-unsatisfied iff `P ( f ) > L i ( f ) + δ. The flow f is said to be at a weak
(δ, )-equilibrium iff the total volume of weakly δ-unsatisfied agents is at most .
Note that every (δ, )-equilibrium is also a weak (δ, )-equilibrium.
Theorem 7. Suppose that the bulletin board is updated at intervals of length
T ≤ min
{
1
4 D α β
, 1
}
.
For the proportional sampling policy combined with the linear migration policy, the number of update periods not
starting at a weak (δ, )-equilibrium is bounded from above by
O
(
1
 · T ·
(
`max
δ
)2)
.
Proof. We use a similar argument here. Again, consider a phase starting at time t such that f (t) is not at a weak
(δ, )-equilibrium. Define Pδi = {P ∈ Pi | `P (t) > L i (t) + δ} and let Pδ =
⋃
i∈[k] Pδi . Consider the potential gain
of agents using paths in Pδ throughout a phase of length T . By Lemma 4,
∆Φ ≤ 1
2
∑
P,Q∈P
VP Q
≤ exp(−1) T
2
∑
i∈[k]
∑
P∈Pδi
∑
Q∈Pi
fP (t) fQ(t) (`P (t)− `Q(t))
ri `max
(`Q(t)− `P (t))
= −exp(−1) T
2 `max
∑
i∈[k]
∑
P∈Pδi
fP (t)
∑
Q∈Pi
fQ(t) (`P (t)− `Q(t))2
ri
.
Using Jensen’s inequality,
∆Φ ≤ −exp(−1) · T
2 · `max
∑
i∈[k]
∑
P∈Pδi
fP (t)
∑
Q∈Pi
fQ(t) · (`P − `Q)
ri
2
= −exp(−1) · T
2 · `max
∑
i∈[k]
∑
P∈Pδi
fP (t)(`P − L i ( f (t)))2
≤ −exp(−1) ·  · δ
2 · T
2 · `max ,
where for the equality we have used
∑
P∈Pi fQ = ri and the definition of L i , and for the last inequality we have used∑
P∈Pδ fP ≥ . Given a bound on the potential gain per round, the remainder of the proof is analogous to the proof
of Theorem 6. 
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6. Conclusions
We have considered load-adaptive rerouting policies in the Wardrop model under the influence of stale information.
Naive protocols relying on stale information are known to cause oscillation effects that harm performance in practice.
Earlier theoretical analyses support this observation with several negative results, and the same holds true for naive
greedy policies in our model. In this work we have presented a class of smooth adaptation policies that are, despite
their simplicity, able to avoid these effects and are guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium. In order to guarantee
convergence, we have introduced a smoothness condition which requires to slow down the dynamics by a factor which
depends inversely on the maximum age of the information and the maximum slope of the latency functions. For two
particular policies from this class we have given bounds on the time to reach approximate equilibria.
The dependence on the maximum slope of the latency functions is not yet satisfactory for two reasons. First, for
natural classes of latency functions like polynomials of fixed degree, the maximum slope is unbounded. Second, if
we consider the network together with the latency functions as an input to a distributed algorithm, then our bounds
on the convergence time that depend on the maximum latency are of pseudopolynomial character. This problem is
addressed in a recent paper [10] which considers a special policy which does not satisfy our smoothness condition but
nevertheless converges very quickly.
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